In so doing, the Court has dismantled the Framers' work. Certainly, the Court has abandoned the Framers' understanding that the Indian Commerce Clause would serve as an independent barrier to the application of state law to Indian affairs But the Court's failure to honor the Framers' plan goes even farther. The Framers saw the Indian Commerce Clause fundamentally as a remedy for the uncertainty that had pervaded Indian affairs under prior regimes -specifically, under the Articles of Confederation. In their view, the clause established a clarity of doctrine in the field of Indian affairs that would allow federal Indian policy to move forward unimpeded. By again clouding issues of state authority over Indian affairs, the modern Court has dismantled the Framers' design. And today, as it did in the preconstitutional era, that uncertainty is frustrating federal Indian policy.
This comment chronicles and analyzes the Supreme Court's return to uncertainty in the area of commerce between Indians and non-Indians. The first step, undertaken in part II, is to discern precisely what the Framers intended when they added the words "and with the Indian Tribes" to the Constitution. Part III examines and analyzes the Supreme Court's treatment of the Indian Commerce Clause from the Worcester era through the modern era, laying bare the doubt and confusion created by the Court's modern approach and considering the ramifications of current doctrine. Finally, part IV examines the relevance of the Framers' intent in the twilight of the twentieth century, and discusses the prospect of judicial enforcement of an originalist conception of the Indian Commerce Clause in the modern era.
II. The Intent of the Framers: A Plenary and Exclusive Power over Indian Commerce
The history of the development of the Indian Commerce Clause demonstrates that its Framers intended the clause to remedy the jurisdictional uncertainty that had pervaded Indian affairs under the Articles of Confederation and even under British colonial government. Specifically, the authors of the Constitution conceived of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 as an exclusive commitment to the federal government of control over commerce between Indians and non-Indians. ' " No longer was the uncertain reach of state authority over commerce with the Indians to impede federal Indian policy. [Vol. 19 Despite its promise, the Albany Plan, as it came to be known, was greeted with ambivalence by provincial legislatures jealous of their governmental prerogatives. They either rejected it, delayed consideration of it, or ignored it.!' The final blow came when the plan was entirely ignored by the British King. 2 ' Nonetheless, the Albany Plan established the first recognition by colonial leaders that Indian relations in America could not properly be managed if Indian policy were, splintered among the numerous colonies.
Though the Albany Plan failed, its theme of centralization of power over Indian affairs was soon taken up by the English government. The Crown in 1755 appointed Indian superintendents to take full authority over political relations between the Indians and the British.' Then, in his Proclamation of 1763, King George I moved to halt colonial encroachment on Indian land by establishing, for the first time, a boundary line between Indian and nonIndian lands. ' The most comprehensive initiative came in 1764, when the British Board of Trade proposed a plan to regulate commercial and political Indian affairs under the Crown "so as to sett [sic] aside all local interfering of particular Provinces, which has been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian affairs in general." ' While the plan never was adopted and finally was abandoned in 1768, it set the stage for later initiatives of the united colonies.
'the colonies were soon in open rebellion against the British, and Indian affairs suddenly assumed a new importance. Hostility between the encroaching colonists and the Indians had continued to foment until the Revolution? The British sought to exploit the animosity of many tribes toward the colonists in the hope of enlisting the aid of the Indians in the revolutionary conflict.' The Continental Congress answered the British initiative with its first formal Indian policy, based on a report by its "[h] aving witnessed the great harm done to Indian relations by many separate agreements negotiated by individual governments, the commissioners felt that the handling of all important Indian treaties by the union would better serve the common good." Id. at 127.
20. The dismal legislative record of the Albany Plan in the colonies is recounted by Newbold. Id. at 135-77. 21 . Id. at 172-78. 22. PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 11-13; see aLso NEVBOLD, supra note 14, at 71. 23. PRUCHA, supra note I1, at 13-20. 24 . Id. at 21-22. The plan would have repealed all colonial laws governing Indian affairs and placed control over such affairs in the hands of superintendents appointed by the Crown. Id. at 22.
25. Notably, many Indian tribes sided with the French during the war between England and France that erupted in 1754. PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 11.
26. Id. at 26-27. The Continental Congress's Committee on Indian Affairs reported in July 1775 that "there is too much reason to apprehend that [the English] Administration will spare no pains -to excite the several Nations of Indians to take up arms against these colonies," 2 JOURNALS OFTHE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 174 (Washington, https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/5 COMMENTS Committee on Indian Affairs, on July 12, 1775. Aimed at "securing and preserving the friendship of the Indian Nations,"' 27 the policy called for establishing three Indian departments, one for the northern tribes (which included the Six Nations), one for the southern tribes such as the Cherokee, and a middle department for those in between2 Each department would be headed by commissioners who would have the power "to treat with the Indians in their respective departments, in the name, and on behalf of the united colonies, in order to preserve peace and friendship ... and to prevent their taking part in the present commotions." ' Only nine days later, Franklin presented the Continental Congress with a first draft of the Articles of Confederation that went even farther toward centralizing Indian policy in the Congress. Franklin's draft echoed his Albany Plan by providing that " [n] o Colony shall engage in an offensive War with any Nation of Indians without the Consent of the Congress," calling for a "perpetual Alliance offensive and defensive" with the Six Nations, barring encroachments on Indian lands and purchases of such lands by the colonies, and mandating that any land purchases from the Indians be made only by Congress." A second draft by the Pennsylvanian John Dickinson augmented the centralization of Indian affairs by repeating Franklin's proposed Indian provisions and adding another: Among the powers of the United States under Dickinson's Articles of Confederation was listed that of "Regulating the Trade, and managing all Affairs with the Indians."'"
Franklin's and Dickinson's ideas were not uniformly welcomed. In a July 26, 1776, debate on Dickinson's draft, Edward Rutledge and Thomas Lynch of South Carolina objected to giving Congress the power of managing Indian affairs on the ground that trade with the Indians was too profitable to be surrendered by the states. 32 The South Carolina position was opposed by George Walton of Georgia, who urged centralization of Indian affairs because Georgia was "not equal to the expense of giving the donations to the Indians, which will be necessary to keep them at peace." 33 The power given by the Confederation, to the United States "of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the indians not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any states within its own limits be not infringed or violated" is perhaps, too inexplicit to be applied as a remedy in the present case. The Creeks are an independent tribe, and cannot with propriety be said to be members of the State of Georgia, yet the said State exercises legislative jurisdiction over the territory in dispute. Therefore as the claims of lands are the great source of difference and hostility between the Whites and Indians the before recited power, appears to be entirely unavailing, according to state constructions, in all cases within the jurisdiction of an individual state.
53
The Secretary concluded, in words echoing those of James Wilson eleven years earlier, that "it is apparent from every representation that unless the United States do in reality possess the power 'to manage all affairs with the independent tribes of indians' to observe and enforce all treaties made by the authority of the union that a general indian war may be expected."' For its part, Georgia sought to obtain from Congress a resolution warning the Creeks that any hostilities would be punished by United States forces. 5 Instead, it received a report from the congressional Committee on Indian Affairs recommending that Georgia, as well as North Carolina -which also was involved in the dispute -should ward off hostilities by ceding territory to the United States for use by the Indians.' The committee report accompanying this recommendation concluded that "there is sufficient evidence to shew [sic] that those tribes do not complain altogether without cause," and that "[a]n avaricious disposition in some of our people to acquire large tracts of land and often by unfair means, appears to be the principal source of difficulties with the Indians."" While the committee acknowledged that working out the title to such lands would be difficult, it deemed the uncertainty over state authority created by Article IX to be "far more embarrassing."" The committee thus asserted that [t]he powers necessary to [manage Indian affairs] appear to the committee to be indivisible, and that the parties to the confederation must have intended to give them entire to the Union, or to have given them entire to the State; these powers before the revolution were possessed by the King, and exercised by him nor did they interfere with the legislative right of the colony within its limits ... ..
The disputes between North Carolina, the Cherokee, Georgia, and the Creeks raged through 1788 without resolution. By July 18 of that year the Secretary of War could report to Congress that non-Indian residents of the North Carolina frontier had "committed the most unprovoked and direct outrages against the Cherokee Indians" as to amount to "an actual informal war of the said white inhabitants against the said Cherokees." ' Congress in response could merely reassert its authority over Indian affairs -an authority severely questioned by contemporary events -with a proclamation forbidding encroachments and hostilities by the non-Indians. 6 While the proclamation likely was meaningless, given the lack of respect paid by the states to prior such announcements, the lesson learned from the southern Indian disputes was not. The problems that had arisen under Article IX in New York, North Carolina, and Georgia were well-known to the Framers who gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new national constitution in 1787.
James The construction contended for by those States, if right, appears to the committee, to leave the federal powers, in this case, a mere nullity; and to make it totally uncertain on what principle Congress is to interfere between them and the said tribes; The States not only contend for this construction, but have actually pursued measures in conformity to it. North Carolina has undertaken to assign land to the Cherokees, and Georgia has proceeded to treat with the Creeks concerning peace, lands, and the objects, usually the principal ones in almost every treaty with the Indians. ' 64 This proposal was considered by the Committee on Detail, which responded on August 22 by attempting to narrow it. The committee supplemented a grant of congressional power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States" with the words "and with Indians, within the limits of any state, not subject to the laws thereof." ' This amendment must have looked dangerously like the language of Article IX to Madison and others who favored centralization of the Indian commerce power, though the records on the debates are silent on the point. Whatever the reason, when the clause reappeared in the report of the Committee of Eleven on September 4, the language tagged to the end of the congressional commerce power was shortened to read only "and with the Indian tribes." ' The convention approved the clause on that same day without comment.
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The convention's handling of Indian commerce amounted to only five words, but their import was clear in light of the events leading up to the Constitutional Convention. For four decades, first the colonies and the Crown, and then the states and Congress, had competed for power over Indian affairs. The need for central control of Indian affairs had been recognized by the delegates to the Albany Congress, by the British Crown, and later by many of the drafters of the Articles of Confederation. Experience under Article IX further confirmed that need. The uncertain reach of state authority over Indian relations had embarrassed the Continental Congress in New York and threatened it with the need for military action in the South. In response, Congress, faced with the ambiguity of Article IX, could only assert but not enforce its preeminent power to deal with the Indians. As Madison discerned, the only remedy for this uncertainty was a clear grant of exclusive federal power in the new Constitution. Further proof of the Framers' intent is supplied by their specific deletion of a proviso tagged on to the end of the Indian Commerce Clause that would have preserved state power over Indian affairs within state borders.' Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that the Framers intended the Indian Commerce Clause to remove all doubt about the location of authority over Indian commerce: The states were excluded. Madison could proclaim in the wake of the convention that the federal regulation of "commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered 1830 and 1836, again included among the defects of the Articles of Confederation that "[iln certain cases the authy. of the Confederacy was disregarded," noting that "the Fedl. 
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from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory." ' More limited constructions of the clause are, of course, possible. One such view is that the Indian Commerce Clause was intended merely to make plain the plenary power of the federal government over Indian affairs, not necessarily to exclude the states from that power where the federal government was silent. This view, while it accords with the most recent stance taken on the question by the Supreme Court," is correct but incomplete. The Framers surely did intend the Indian Commerce Clause to make clear the federal power to regulate relations with the Indians. However, events leading up to the drafting of the clause demonstrate that such federal power could be assured in only one way -by making it exclusive. Otherwise, inconsistencies between the positions taken by the states and the federal government would disrupt federal Indian relations under the new Constitution as they had in Georgia and North Carolina under the Articles of Confederation."' The correct and complete view was stated skillfully by Justice Story, who, reflecting on the Indian Commerce Clause in 1833, concluded that it gave "to congress, as the only safe and proper depositary, the exclusive power, which belonged to the crown in the ante-revolutionary times; a power indispensable to the peace of the states, and the just preservation of the rights and territory of the Indians. ' Despite Justice Story's certainty,' however, the confusion over the reach of state power that had frustrated American commerce with the Indians before ratification of the Constitution was only temporarily vanquished. It was to reemerge long after the deaths of Madison and the other Framers, imported back into federal Indian law by Justice Story's successors on the Supreme Court. 5 come readily to the minds of most Indian law attorneys and scholars. They represent the paradigms of two competing approaches to federal Indian law, the former conceiving of tribes as independent sovereigns, the latter conceiving of them as irrelevant anachronisms. 7 The third, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,' is less obvious, but no less momentous to the development of Indian Commerce Clause doctrine, particularly in light of documents now available detailing the Court's approach to that and subsequent cases. The movement of Indian Commerce Clause jurisprudence past these milestones represents the slow unraveling of the Framers' design.
The Court reached the first milestone, Worcester, with a resounding affirmation of the Framers' intent. In 1829 and 1830, gold was discovered on Indian land in Georgia. The State of Georgia sought to end its long struggle against the Cherokee Nation by delivering a coup de, grace: Georgia obliterated the political identity of the Cherokee by enacting two state laws that extinguished the Cherokee tribal government, distributed Cherokee territory to several Georgia counties, and extended Georgia state law over the former Cherokee lands." When a Georgia state court sentenced Samuel Worcester, a white missionary living on Cherokee lands, to four years in prison at hard labor for violating a state law prohibiting whites from living in the Cherokee territory without a state license, the Supreme Court heard Worcester's appeal." In an opinion the Court itself has described as one of [T]he acts of Georgia are repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our Constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the Union.'
Despite its eloquent tone and moral force, Chief Justice Marshall's view of the Worcester case was not unanimous. In a notable concurrence, Justice McLean sounded a theme that was to gain force in Indian law jurisprudence in the coming years. "The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians within a state," McLean wrote, "is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary."" He went on to reason that, If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers as to lose the power of self-government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over them. The point at which this exercise of power by a State would be proper, need not now be considered, if, indeed, it be a judicial question." In 1881, the Court modified this view at the second milestone. In United States v. McBratney, the Court affirmed the power of the State of Colorado to try a white man for the murder of a white man within the Ute Indian Reservation." The decision was the first by the Court allowing state law to operate on an Indian Reservation, and it marked a withdrawal from the conceptual clarity of Chief Justice Marshall's Worcester opinion. Its inconsistency with Worcester also created the first uncertainty in Indian commerce doctrine since Article IX was replaced by the Indian Commerce Clause. If a non-Indian who violated the laws of Georgia in the Cherokee Territory was outside the reach of state law, how could a non-Indian who violated the laws of Colorado on the Ute Reservation be subject to state prosecution? The Court failed to provide any answers in McBratney itself, a murky opinion in which Justice Gray, writing for the majority, apparently found that the Colorado Enabling Act repealed all prior statutes inconsistent with itself, including those providing for federal court jurisdiction over major crimes on Indian reservations." Significantly, however, the Court cited to were in a situation similar to that of the Wyandotts in Cisna -"pressed upon" by a white population, their territory subject to "a mixed occupancy ... by the red and white men." Id. at 754-55. The Court, however, found this situation irrelevant, stating that while "[i]t may be that they [the Shawnees] cannot exist much longer as a distinct people in the presence of the civilization of Kansas," they nevertheless were immune to a Kansas tax on their property as long as they retained their tribal organization. Id. at 756. The Court also reaffirmed the Indian Commerce Clause as an independent bar to state authority in its characterization of the Shawnees as "a people distinct from others, capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union." Id. at 755 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
88. to the rules of decision in cases involving state power over Indian reservations as the modem era opened. Although the holdings of these cases were fundamentally inconsistent with the holding of Worcester, which barred absolutely any exercise of state power over Indian reservations, the analytical framework they established could be viewed as consistent with Worcester in a broad sense: Where Indian interests were involved, as they were in Worcester, the Indian Commerce Clause, along with any applicable treaties or statutes, blocked state exertions of regulatory power. Where no Indians or Indian interests were involved, the constitutional concerns that animated Worcester were not implicated and state regulation was valid. 98 But even this analytical framework was soon to break down.
The warning signs began with a series of cases in which the Court distanced itself from the clarity of Worcester's approach through a number of statements suggesting that Justice McLean's view was prevailing over Chief Justice Marshall's. Beginning in 1959 with an admission that the Court had "modified" the principles of Worcester," the erosion of Chief Justice Marshall's rubric picked up speed in 1962 with an observation by Justice Frankfurter that the "general notion" of an Indian reservation as an island free from state law "has yielded to closer analysis when confronted, in the course of subsequent developments, with diverse concrete situations. Building on a portion of the Moe opinion affirming the validity of a Montana state tax applied to sales of cigarettes to non-Indians by an Indian smokeshop, the Court in Colville upheld a similar Washington tax, as well as a state sales tax. The Court so held despite the facts that the tribes in the case imposed their own tax on the cigarettes, and that application of the state taxes would put tribal sales at a competitive disadvantage with non-Indian cigarette sellers."°' In so holding, Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected an argument that the tax was invalidated by the "negative implications" of the Indian Commerce Clause:
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own force, automatically bars all state taxation of matters significantly touching the political and economic interests of the Tribes. That Clause may have a more limited role to play in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, Indian commerce."' 0 With the constitutional argument removed from play, the Court resolved the case by weighing the limited tribal interest -weakened, the Court found, by the fact that tribal revenues in the case were derived not from value generated on the reservation but, rather, from the marketing of an asserted tax Colville's explicit rejection of the Indian Commerce Clause as a significant factor in cases involving disputes over state power on Indian reservations makes it a pivotal decision, but it is all the more pivotal in light of the fact that the justices originally decided the case in favor of the tribes. The case emerged from the justices' conference in October 1979, with a majority for invalidation of the state cigarette and sales taxes as applied to tribal smokeshops; the opinion for the court was assigned to Justice Brennan."' Justice Brennan's first and second drafts of the opinion, circulated around the Court during the next two months, analyzed the case in much the same manner as his eventual dissent, holding the state taxes invalid because they would penalize the tribe for imposing its own taxes. This conflicted with the federal policy of encouraging tribal economic development."' Regarding the Indian Commerce Clause, Brennan said that "rarely does the talismanic invocation of constitutional language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal sovereignty shed light on difficult problems" of state power on reservations. However much we would like some clarification from Congress in this area, we have received none in recent years. I find the suggestion that until we do we should resolve doubtful cases against the Indians extraordinary. Rather, I think, we must attempt to fill in the interstices in existing laws and treaties as best we can. That process inevitably involves appropriate reference to broad federal policies and notions of Indian sovereignty, however amorphous. I do not read 
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Perhaps most remarkable is that instead of presaging a wholesale extension of state law to Indian reservations, Colville was the precursor to a series of cases in which state assertions of authority over non-Indians on Indian reservations were for the most part invalidated. The trend began with White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker," where the balancing approach employed by Justice White in Colville first blossomed in Justice Marshall's hand into the "particularized inquiry" test that now sets the standard in this area of federal Indian law. The case arose when Arizona sought to levy its gross receipts and use fuel taxes on a logging corporation that contracted with the White Mountain Apache Tribe to harvest reservation timber.
2 ' In considering the tribe's challenge to the taxes, the Court identified two potential barriers to assertions of state regulatory power over reservations and Indians: First, such state regulations may be preempted by federal law, and, second, they may infringe on tribal sovereignty.' " In assessing the preemption of state laws that seek to regulate non-Indians engaging in on-reservation activities, the Court called for "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law."'" Applying the particularized inquiry test in Bracker, the Court found the state taxes preempted by the comprehensive federal regulation of timber harvesting on the reservation, especially in light of the state's failure to supply any services justifying its tax. I do not agree that the statement.., in Moe -referring to automatic exemptions as a matter of constitutional law -should be read as broadly as you suggest. Certainly the language of the footnote does not extend that far. Moreover, a number of our cases recognize the principle that the exercise of state authority over the reservation may be impermissible, not because it is "preempted" in the ordinary sense, but because it infringes on tribal self-government.... This princi- invalid as applied to a non-Indian equipment dealer who sold eleven tractors to the Gila River Indian Tribe," to a construction firm that contracted to build a tribal school for the Navajos, 29 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/5 recognized that this approach provides precious little guidance to states or tribes.' 35 This result was inevitable, given that the Court settled for a factspecific, case-by-case approach for resolving disputes over application of state law on Indian reservations. The uncertainty generated by the Court's approach has been exacerbated by what can only be characterized as inconsistencies in its application of its own particularized inquiry test. The Court has failed to fashion consistent rules for measuring the federal, state, and tribal interests that are weighed in the particularized inquiry calculus. The Court's treatment of each of these interests will be examined in turn.
A. Federal Interest
The Court has found state law preempted where it was inconsistent with a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of some aspect of relations between Indians and non-Indians. However, the Court's assessment of what constitutes comprehensive regulation has varied. The clearest example of comprehensive federal regulation was in Bracker, where federal statutes and regulations governed the smallest details of tribal timber harvesting, and where the tribal timber sale operation was effectively conducted by the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs.'
36 But the Court also deemed federal regulation comprehensive in Mescalero -where federal involvement was limited to approving tribal hunting ordinances, providing advice on tribal bag limits and hunting seasons, and stocking fish and elk on tribal lands.' 37 Federal regulation was deemed comprehensive also in Central Machinery, where the Court focused on the federal government's long history of control over Indian traders despite the fact that the merchant involved in the case was not federally licensed and thus was not subject to such controls.
3
This would make sense but for the stark contrast provided by the Court's decision in Cotton Petroleum. In Cotton Petroleum, the Court found federal regulation of mineral leasing pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 to be "extensive" but not sufficiently comprehensive to assume preemptive proportions.'
39 Yet the scheme of federal regulation in Cotton Petroleum approached the level of detail of the federal timber regulations 135. Justice Rehnquist in particular has lamented that the "general question [of the validity of state law on Indian reservations] has occupied the Court many times in the recent past, and seems destined to demand its attention over and over again until the Court sees fit to articulate, and follow, a consistent and predictable rule of law." Rama Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am convinced that a well-defined body of principles is essential in order to end the need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the law for a number of years.").
136. 
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inquiry analysis in the absence of a tradition of tribal control over the specific activity at issue. Thus, in Rice the Court applied California's liquor license law to an on-reservation liquor retailer based in part on a finding that "tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians."'' In Cotton Petroleum, the Court's finding that New Mexico's oil and gas production taxes applied to mineral lessees of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe was partly based on a finding that " [t] here is . . . simply no history of tribal independence from state taxation of these lessees to form a 'backdrop' against which the 1938 [Indian Mineral Leasing Act] must be read."' 52 By requiring a history of tribal authority over a given activity in certain cases, the Court threatens to severely limit the reach of tribal sovereignty.
3 More significantly for the purposes of this discussion, by imposing such a requirement at times and not imposing it at other times, the Court introduces yet another element of uncertainty into its particularized inquiry analysis.
C. State Interest
The Court seemed to establish a rule to govern the state interest element of the particularized inquiry analysis in Colville when it said that the states' "legitimate governmental interest in raising revenues . . . is . . . strongest when the [state] tax is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state services."'" Yet the Court has not adhered to this foLmulation, at times invalidating state taxation despite a significant state role in the activity at issue. Thus, in Central Machinery Co., a non-Indian equipment corporation was held immune from state tax for sales to onreservation Indians despite the fact that the corporation was chartered by the sutte and did business in the state at large. 55 In Montana v. Crow Tribe, the Court summarily affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision invalidating application of Montana's severance and gross proceeds taxes to tribal coal despite the state's provision of numerous services to miners and others involved in coal 
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/5 production, its treatment of pollution and disposal of solid wastes from coal mining, and its contribution of $500,000 to build a road used by employees and suppliers of a tribal coal mine. 56 The contrast, once again, is provided by Cotton Petroleum, where suddenly the Court found provision of state services to be dispositive of the particularized inquiry analysis. In Cotton Petroleum, the Court found the state's provision of $89,384 worth of services to Cotton Petroleum Corporation over a five-year period, and its regulation of the spacing and mechanical integrity of wells, to justify imposing taxes amounting to eight percent of the corporation's production value.' 57 The Court also referred to the fact that New Mexico provided general services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton Petroleum costing about $3 million per year. 55 The Court failed, however, to explain how the provision of such general services in Cotton Petroleum assumed greater significance than it did in Ranah, where the Court dismissed the state's argument "that the significant services it provides to the Ramah Navajo Indians justify the imposition of [its] tax" on the ground that the benefits were not "in any way related to the construction of schools on Indian land." 59 As with the federal and Indian interests involved in the particularized inquiry analysis, the Court has failed to treat the state interest component consistently.
The fact-specific particularized inquiry test creates uncertainty in cases involving commerce between Indians and non-Indians. Inconsistent application of the test compounds that uncertainty. Without question, the Court has departed from the Framers' intent that the Indian Commerce Clause serve as an exclusive commitment to Congress of the power to regulate relations between Indians and non-Indians. But the Court has undone the Framers' intent in an even more fundamental way. In the broadest sense, the Framers saw the Indian Commerce Clause as a remedy for the uncertainty that had crippled federal Indian policy in the preconstitutional era. The Supreme Court's particularized inquiry jurisprudence has resurrected the very uncertainty that the Framers sought to banish. The Court has essentially "blown the dust off' of Article IX of the Articles of Confederation. Today, as under Article IX, the limit of state authority over commerce between Indians and non-Indians is a matter of conjecture, and one about which federal and state officials and Indian leaders frequently disagree. no longer the case -as it was in the preconstitutional era -that federal Indian policy is frustrated because of doubts about the federal government's power vis-.-vis state power. It is well settled that federal power over Indian affairs is plenary."w The modern frustration of federal Indian policy is more subtle.
Since passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,"6 t the federal government's Indian policy has focused on encouraging tribal self-government and independence." 6 The Supreme Court's particularized inquiry jurisprudence creates incentives that stand in tension with that federal goal. Tribes are encouraged by Congress to assume control of institutions that for years have been administered by the federal government, yet they are effectively warned by the Court that, as they step out from under the protective shield of federal regulation, their dealings with non-Indians -i.e., Indian commerce in the most fundamental sense of the term -will become vulnerable to state taxation and regulation." The Court could have facilitated Congress's Indian policy by providing a clear rule for states and tribes to follow in working out their legal relationships with one another. The Indian Commerce Clause as Madison and Worcester conceived of it sets out just such a rule. Instead, the Court has given Indian tribes the particularized inquiry test and with it the incentive to hold tight to the federal presence in thair affairs. Thus, Indians face a Court-imposed pressure to remain in some sense as they were 100 years ago -"wards of the nation. ' "
IV. The Understanding of the Framers in the Modem Era
Despite the strong evidence that the Framers intended an Indian Commerce Clause far more potent than the one that survives today, the question none the less arises, "Why do we care?" After all, much has happened since Madison and others drafted the clause. Indian affairs, which at that time was a major item on the national agenda, is now a minor blip on the national screen. Is it necessary or even wise, one may ask, to bind modern federal Indian policy to an eighteenth century understanding of Indian relations with non-Indians, to create, as one commentator described it, "the dilemma of transposing U.S.C. app.) (providing for strengthening of tribal control over federal Indian programs such as education assistance programs).
163. The Solicitor General in his Ramah amicus brief noted "the awkward tension created by the focus on the pervasiveness of federal regulations as the principal barrier to State assertions of jurisdiction in a day when the Political Branches are committed to encouraging tribal selfgovernment, in part by loosening federal control of reservation affairs." Federal Amicus Brief, supra note 129, at 13.
164. Kagama The answer, as one may have guessed at this stage of the discussion, is that it is both necessary and wise. That it is necessary is demonstrated by the frustration of federal Indian policy that inheres in the Court's current approach. That it is wise is demonstrated by two additional points. First, while relations between Indians and non-Indians certainly have undergone dramatic changes since 1787, the understanding of the Framers in this area is not wholly out of step with the modem world. The Framers did not arrive at their conception of exclusive federal control over Indian policy based on a vision of Indian tribes as distant sovereigns whose affairs implicated few state concerns. While certainly many Indian tribes in 1787 existed far west of the boundaries of any of the original states, the ideas of Madison and Franklin were informed by the contemporary reality of states holding Indian territory within their borders, as illustrated by the preconstitutional conflicts in New York, Georgia, and North Carolina.'" Thus, in some respects, the situation of Arizona or Montana today does not vary so greatly from that of Georgia or New York in 1787. The Indian policy notions of the Framers are not inherently anachronistic.
Second, by committing to Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce with the Indians, the Framers did not freeze federal Indian policy in time. They simply provided that if changes in circumstances necessitate changes in Indian policy, it is for Congress to make those changes. This is hardly a startling concept, and it should not cause great concern for advocates of either tribal or state interests. The history of United States Indian policy is largely one of congressional reactions to altered circumstances. From the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790,67 passed to shore up the new government's exclusive control over Indian affairs in an era when Indians still posed a military threat to the nation, through the removal treaties signed with many Eastern tribes in the nineteenth century," to the General Allotment Act of 1887' and its assimilation agenda, and finally to the modem encouragement of self-determination, congressional Indian policy has tracked shifting societal demands and the rise, fall, and rise again of tribal sovereignty throughout the nation's history.' 7 During this period Congress has also considered the needs of states that hold Indian country within their borders to 170. The cycle of federal Indian policy from colonial times to the present, and its impact on modem federal Indian law, is traced in WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 7-23.
